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The Ready Materials for Another World:
Frontier, Security, and the Hindustan-Tibet Road
in the 19th-Century Northwestern Himalaya
Kyle J. Gardner

This article examines the different ways
in which the British conceived of and
configured the northwestern Himalaya
in the mid-19th century. It focuses on the
proposal, construction, and justification
of the Hindustan-Tibet Road from the late
1840s through to the 1860s. By examining this
particular episode in British frontier formation,
I hope to show that the pacific perception
of this “natural frontier” region allowed for a
plurality of configurations that would not be
possible on the more contested and violent
imperial fronts. Only when this region was
integrated into a conceptually unified frontier
did it become subsumed into a larger imperial
security rubric—and once again became
considered insecure.
Keywords: Hindustan-Tibet Road, Northwestern Himalaya,
British, environment, frontier, security.

Upon reaching the crest of the ridge at Semla1, the vastness of the
scene became oppressive. The lofty snowy range shone from the
dense azure of the heavens… Below was heaped a shattered mass
of mountains, peaks and glens, ridges and valleys, some aridly
bare, others luxuriantly rich. The ready materials for another
world. [Lloyd 1840: 140]
—Major Sir William Lloyd, 1821

Our policy is to keep clear of intrusion all the approaches to India,
and to hold in our hands the keys of all its gates. […] The outer
frontier of the British dominion that our policy now requires us to
defend, has immense circumstance. […] The consequence of this
expansion of our sphere of political influence far beyond the area
of our actual dominion is that the frontiers of the British Empire
are changing their character. [Lyall 1911: 375]
—Sir Alfred Lyall, 1911
Introduction
For those concerned with the geo-political expansion of
British India, the nine decades stretching between these
two authors presented a variety of frontier configurations
on the subcontinent. Besides demarcating the often-vague
limits of territorial expansion, frontiers represented a
variety of imperial ambitions, fears, and technological
realities. As British India’s northern boundaries were
mapped and information about them was compiled to
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produce more detailed systems of knowledge, the concept
of frontier space became solidly tied to imperial security.
Paradoxically, the more that became known about this
frontier, the less “secure” it would become. By the close
of the 19th century, this need for security beyond the
Himalaya induced Britain to invade Tibet in order to
forcibly establish diplomatic and commercial relations.
The northwestern Himalayan border established by the
British at the end of the first half of the 19th century
still remains mostly intact today. Its’ exact location and
ownership, however, remain contentious in several places.
The post-independence Government of India classified its
easternmost regions as part of the “inner line,” a space
deemed off-limits to visitors (and in some cases, non-local
Indians) for much of the 20th century, on the grounds of
national security. Security has thus been at the forefront
of British and Indian government policies regarding the
region for well over a century. However, this was not
always and exclusively so. Initially acquired through
expansionistic wars, the region became—for several
decades at least—a kind of laboratory for experiments in
commercial and technological endeavors.
This article aims to examine the different ways in
which British administrators viewed the northwestern
Himalayan frontier from their early encounters with
the region in the beginning of the 19th century up to
the (partial) construction of the Hindustan-Tibet Road
(1850s) and its immediate aftermath. Geographically
speaking, this paper focuses on the western side of the
northwestern Himalaya, which encompasses the modern
Indian districts of Kinnaur, Kullu, Lahaul and Spiti, and
Leh. As its’ primary sources are largely official and British,
its’ perspective is accordingly constricted. Materials that
could give us crucial and contradictory local perspectives
on this particular intrusion into the region do not, to my
knowledge, exist.2 It is important for readers to note that
while the project of building the Hindustan-Tibet Road—
the focus of this paper—required the labor of hundreds of
thousands of human beings, their voices remain silent.
Furthermore, as the British had very limited knowledge of,
and interaction with the eastern side of the northwestern
Himalaya on the Tibetan plateau during the period under
consideration3 this paper will omit any substantive
discussion of Tibetan and Chinese political history in the
early to mid 19th century.4 The perception of the region
as being commercially tied to Central Asia (and thus
within the expanding commercial and political sphere of
Russia5) prevented British administrators from articulating
a “backdoor to China” argument for regional expansion,
a common reason given for attempting to commercially
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and politically engage with Tibet. The episode of the
Hindustan-Tibet Road is notable, in part, for the absence
of any mention of establishing communication with Lhasa,
which was, as Alastair Lamb has argued, a dominant 19th
century British rationale for expansion into the broader
Himalayan region.
By examining this particular episode in British frontier
formation, I hope to show that the pacific perception of
this “natural frontier” region allowed for a plurality of
configurations that would not be possible on the more
contested and violent imperial fronts. Only when this
region was integrated into a conceptually unified frontier
did it become subsumed into a larger imperial security
rubric—and once again became considered insecure. I also
hope to challenge a dominant strain found in political
histories of the broader Himalayan region that suggests
British interest in the western Himalaya was driven
almost exclusively by security concerns.6 Instead, I would
like to suggest that the logics behind early to mid 19th
century British interventions in the region were also
concerned with commercial gains, securing recreational
and residential space for colonists, and the technological
practices that accompanied exploration and territorial
solidification.
While the basic causes of the British East India Company’s
expansion into the Himalaya may be explained in the
broader context of European colonialism in South Asia,
the specifics of British extension into the northwestern
Himalaya present us with interesting and exceptional
particulars. Prior to the 19th century, the northwestern
Himalayan region had existed as a collection of small
mountainous polities, at times highly autonomous, at
other times contained within the political, economic, and
cultural spheres of neighboring states. At no time till the
British began solidifying their control of the region in the
late 1840s, however, were these regions brought together
under a unified border. The northwestern Himalaya—by
the latter half of the 19th century—was incorporated into
a single surveyed, mapped, and defended international
frontier. That this frontier increasingly became an
“international” one reflects the simultaneous processes of
scientifically determining its location and diplomatically
configuring those regions that lay beyond it.
Recently, Kapil Raj has extended C. A. Bayly’s studies of
information flows in late 18th and 19th century British
India to examine the complex circulation of technologies
around South Asia—technologies partially derived from
indigenous British or South Asian sources and partially the
result of hybrid colonial formations on the subcontinent

(Raj 2007). On the edges of the empire, the distribution
of these technologies was particularly uneven. Early
intelligence “failure[s] on the fringes of empire”—as Bayly
has styled the British attempts at intelligence gathering
during and immediately after the Anglo-Nepalese War
(1814-15)—led to the re-evaluation and institutionalization
of information gathering practices (Bayly 1996: 135141). In some cases, as Kapil Raj and Patrick Carroll
have persuasively shown, colonial peripheries (India
and Ireland, respectively) were at the forefront of
technoterritorialization.7 In the case of the British in the
northwestern Himalaya, this process is best illustrated by
the construction of the Hindustan-Tibet Road, a project
that coerced hundreds of thousands of laborers into
the service of the British. In the essay that follows I will
survey the different ways in which the British initially
conceived of, and configured the northwestern Himalaya.
After surveying British penetration into the region in the
early 19th century, I will focus on their most substantive
intervention in the region: the proposal, construction, and
justification of the Hindustan-Tibet Road.
Early Encounters
Unlike the evolution of the North-West Frontier, the
northwestern Himalaya, once acquired by the East India
Company, provided what was generally viewed by British
policy makers throughout the 19th century to be “the
finest natural combination of boundary and barrier that
exists in the world” (Holdich 1916: 280). As the political
fluctuations of early 19th century northern India shifted in
favor of the British East India Company, the blank spaces
on the existing maps increasingly overlapped with the
Company’s growing political possessions. This physical
and political expansion resulted in a burst of Himalayan
exploration in the first half of the 19th century and
the subsequent publication of a number of travelogues
and official reports. In these texts, environment and its
practical uses, as John MacKenzie (1986, 1988) has noted
concerning the larger genre of British travel narratives,
figures prominently. Reflecting a growing interest in
natural history that would peak in the latter half of the
19th century, many accounts of the Himalaya by explorers,
surveyors, soldiers, hunters, or missionaries, included
descriptions of and allusions to the environment.8 The
findings of this growing network of scholars, policy
makers, military officers, and amateur adventurers were
increasingly being collected and published in the pages
of the Royal Geographical Society’s Journal and associated
publications. More often than not this “science” was for
the practical benefit of the empire. The application of

advanced and varied surveying techniques, in particular,
led to the spatial codification of the Himalaya by the
Survey of India’s “Great Trigonometric Survey” in the
1860s and 1870s.
The British East India Company first came into formal
contact with the broader Himalayan region in 1774
when Warren Hastings speculated on the significance
of the Himalayan region for India’s defense and for the
expansion of British trade (with Tibet and, through it,
China) (Teltscher 2007: 49-50). That year he sent George
Bogle to Bhutan and Tibet (which Hastings initially
believed to be one state) in a first attempt to establish
trans-Himalayan diplomatic and commercial relations.
A few Western travellers had gone into the Himalayan
regions prior to this.9 It was only with the Anglo-Nepalese
War (1814-1815) and the territorial concessions that
followed, however, that the British were brought into
direct contact with the western Himalayan region. This
contact, however, was gradual and (to use Aniket Alam’s
phrase) “non-cataclysmic”; the regions’ terrain made the
application of standard British administrative practices
difficult to consistently and quickly implement. Instead,
the British brought this region of diverse polities and
diffused populations under a single administrator (the
Superintendent of Hill States)—a slow and uneven process
that reflected an early view of the region as non-essential.
The seventy-five years following Bogle’s mission witnessed
a substantial consolidation of many of the states in the
northwestern Himalaya by a series of regional imperial
hopefuls: beginning with the Gurkha rulers of Nepal,
followed by the Sikh Empire (1799-1849) of Maharaja Ranjit
Singh, and ending with the Dogra Maharaja Gulab Singh
of Kashmir and Jammu and his successors ruling under
British suzerainty. By the end of the Second Anglo-Sikh
war (1848-9), the British directly administered a number of
districts throughout the region, while allowing others to
continue as indirectly ruled princely states.
In 1768, the Gurkha leader Prithvi Narayan Shah
unified the diverse ethnic groups of much of the central
Himalayan region into the kingdom of Nepal. When
Chinese forces defeated them in 1792, they turned their
attention westward and by 1804 had conquered all the hill
states between Nepal and the Sutlej River (Ray 1986: 194).
In 1806, Gurkha forces crossed the Sutlej and defeated
the raja of Kangra. In desperation, Kangra’s ruler sought
assistance from the Sikh Maharaja, Ranjit Singh. In May
1809, Ranjit Singh sent forces to Kangra and pushed the
Gurkhas across the Sutlej and subsequently made himself
suzerain of that hill state and several others.
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Following 1803, when the EIC took the Delhi territories,
the Calcutta-based Company’s attention gradually turned
northward, sending their first official expedition to gather
information about the territories under Gurkha rule
in 1808. “This expedition was sponsored by the Asiatic
Society of Bengal and was ostensibly meant to explore
the areas watered by the river Ganges” (Alam 2008: 99102). According to Aniket Alam, the published report of
the expedition indicates that another goal was to gather
information about the region’s economy (specifically
the trade with the region known as Chinese Turkestan),
its socio-political condition, and the nature of Gurkha
administration.10 The report contains detailed references
to the internal organization of the Gurkha rulers in this
region, the nature of agricultural production, natural
resources, and physical conditions.
In 1818, the British sent a team under Alexander Gerard
to explore the Sutlej and the possibility of trade across
the mountains. This team eventually crossed into
western Tibet along the route that would later become
the Hindustan-Tibet Road.11 By the 1820s, British media
reported sporadic accounts of western Himalayan
commercial goods arriving in British-held towns
(particularly Rampur, in Bashahr) along this route.12
Slowly, the British began perceiving the pre-existing trade
routes and commercial potential of the region.
By the late 19th and early 20th century, historians of
British India would provide a number of consistent
explanations for this early British regional interest, all
of which focused on the insecurity posed by neighboring
states. Vincent Smith’s views on the Himalayan frontier
combined the central problem of security of British rule
with the need for maintaining British prestige. Smith,
ironically, defended the British annexation of the southern
regions of the western Himalaya on the ground that the
Nepalis had appeared as the unwelcome conquerors—
“oriental despots,” as so many Asian dynasties were
termed—and the memory of their harshness was still alive
among local populations (Smith 1928).
Sir John Foster George Ross-of-Bladenburg, the biographer
of Lord Hastings, similarly viewed the Himalayan frontier
primarily from the perspective of defense. Discussing
the effect of the Anglo-Nepalese War on the British, he
observed, “it defined relations with Nepal—all danger
for the Northern frontier removed for ever” (Ross-ofBladenburg 1893: 63, 82). With the exception of Paul
Roberts, few historians by the late 19th century made
any reference to the possibility of utilizing Himalayan
resources—or its position as a commercial conduit—for the
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material benefit of British India (Roberts 1938). By the mid20th century we find the dominant view of the region’s
history solidified in the work of Alastair Lamb. Writing
primarily in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Lamb’s work
focused on the evolution of frontiers into international
borders between regional powers. The minimizing of
commercial concerns in recounting the northwestern
Himalaya’s 19th century history suggests that the securitybased narrative that became preeminent by the beginning
of the 20th century had occluded all other considerations
as the dominant historical trope. However, as we will
soon see with Moorcroft’s travels, (and more significantly
with the construction of the Hindustan-Tibet Road), the
prospect of commercial gains in the western Himalaya was
also prominent in the logic of expansion.
Meanwhile, Ladakh was in a state of political turmoil as the
result of a series of weak kings. William Moorcroft reached
Ladakh’s capital in September 1820 while en route to
Central Asia. His apparent project was to find more robust
horse breeds to improve the EIC’s stock. The first officially
practicing veterinarian in the Company, Moorcroft was
also tasked with exploring the possibilities of opening up
the trans-Himalayan region to British commerce. Although
distrusted and obstructed by the Ladakhi officials in
Leh, after two years Moorcroft managed to make several
friends.13 During his stay, Moorcroft wrote detailed
letters to Calcutta, noting the commercial and strategic
importance of the region. He suggested that British control
would allow them to access the pashmina trade from
western Tibet, in addition to the potentially large markets
of Central Asia (Moorcroft and Trebeck 2005: 151-154).
In May 1821, Moorcroft signed a commercial agreement
with Ladakh’s rulers. Under the agreement, the EIC’s
merchants were “permitted to trade with Ladakh and
through it with the Chinese and Western Turkestan” (Ray
1986: 198). His stay in Ladakh aroused the suspicions of
Maharaja Ranjit Singh who sent envoys to Leh to look into
Moorcroft’s activities. Moorcroft openly replied to the
envoys that if the rumors of a Sikh military force being
assembled were true, the pashmina industry of Kashmir
would be greatly hurt. Moorcroft’s letter to the Sikh ruler
was, according to Moorcroft, written to alarm him and
avert any invasion of Ladakh until the Governor-General
made a decision on whether to accept the Ladakhi ruler’s
apparent request for aid. Moorcroft’s letter did not have
the intended effect.
Ranjit Singh’s agent in Delhi passed the letter on to
the British Resident and demanded an explanation. In
response, the Governor-General wrote to the maharaja

explaining that Moorcroft had acted on his own and that
the offer from Ladakh was rejected.
In 1834, Zorawar Singh, a general of the Dogra Raja of
Jammu, Gulab Singh, invaded Ladakh. Over the following
years he slowly pressed on towards Tibet in an attempt
to further consolidate control over the trade routes and
subdue a resisting Ladakhi populace (Panḍit 1970; Charak
1977: 206-233). However, as he was marching towards
Lhasa his supply lines became stretched during a severe
winter and he was forced to retreat to Ladakh.14 On the
return, however, he managed to capture Lahaul and Spiti,
ensuring that Ladakh—if not western Tibet—would stay
firmly within Dogra control.15
A decade later, the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej—the boundary
marker between Sikh and British territories—starting
what became known as the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845-46)
(Farwell 1972: 37-8). In March 1846, after a British victory,
Ranjit Singh’s successor signed the Treaty of Amritsar.
Under the treaty, Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler of the
suzerain state of Jammu,16 was appointed the Maharaja
of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, Baltistan, and Hazara. In
exchange for this title, he recognized the supremacy of
the British and agreed to a joint frontier commission to
officially establish his state’s borders. He also agreed to
pay the British an annual tribute of “one horse, twelve
perfect shawl goats of approved breed […] and three pair of
Kashmir shawls” (Drew 1875: 547).
By the late 1840s we find official reports detailing the
western Himalaya’s commercial assets, the disposition of
its inhabitants, and suggestions for further exploration.
In addition to pashmina, “in [the western parts of] this
region there are magnificent forests of timber-trees; fruit
trees and hedgerows are everywhere abundant” (United
Kingdom, House of Commons 1854: 120-22). Only two
decades after Lloyd optimistically “discovered” the vaguely
described “ready materials for another world,” that world
had been annexed and soon would be classified, quantified,
and made usable by the region’s newly hegemonic power.
More importantly, because of the apparent security
achieved by their expansion to the “natural” limits of
northern India, the British would soon begin making use of
their new territory in a variety of non-military ways.
Trade, Servitude, and the Hindustan-Tibet Road
Unlike the tumultuous events taking place at the
northwestern edges of British India, the 1846 settlement
of Britain’s relations with the Princely State of Jammu
and Kashmir made the still vaguely defined northwestern
Himalaya one of the most stable portions of the imperial

perimeter. Sparsely populated and naturally enclosed
by some of the world’s highest peaks, the northwestern
Himalaya could be leisurely explored, lightly administered,
and easily defended. This stability convinced the Earl of
Dalhousie (Governor-General, 1847-1856), who himself
had begun to regularly visit the northwestern Himalaya
(his favorite retreat was Kalpa in Kinnaur—then known
as Chini), to explore the possibility of establishing trade
roads through the mountains, in part to access the primary
object of commercial interest: pashmina.
Properly speaking, pashmina is the material woven from
pashm, the downy undercoat of the Tibetan goat (changra:
“north[ern] goat”). Janet Rizvi estimates that in 1823, “the
annual turnover of the industry at first price (before the
addition of taxes, manufacturers’ and middlemen’s profits,
brokers’ fees, and transport costs) was estimated at some
Rs30 lakh, amounting perhaps in today’s money to Rs120
crore [roughly US$25 million]” (Rizvi and Ahmed 2009:
13-14, 18). Its value reflects the vast distances and variety
of groups long involved in this trans-Himalayan trade.
Originating high up on the Tibetan Plateau in the goat
herds of the semi-nomadic Changpa, the combed pashm
was traded annually to Ladakhi or Kashmiri middlemen,
who in turn sold the wool to Kashmiri merchants who,
in turn, sold it to the great shawl-weaving houses of the
Kashmir valley. Eighteenth-century European traders
‘discovered’ Kashmiri shawls, which were marked by a
characteristic woven design, a teardrop with a bent tip
(Zutshi 2009). This design inspired one of the most oftenrepeated Western textile motifs, commonly known today
as “paisley.”
The presence of Muslim traders living in the
predominantly Buddhist region of eastern Ladakh, as well
as in Lhasa,17 further illustrates the deeply entrenched
role played by the pashmina trade throughout the transHimalaya. These trade routes were reinforced by the
long-established connections between the Buddhist
centers of Tibet and the predominantly Tibetan Buddhist
regions of the western Himalaya. The reciprocal flows of
pilgrims, religious students, and traders ensured a wellworn series of routes with regular villages along the way to
provide lodging, food, and fresh supplies of ponies, yaks, or
donkeys. Regular pilgrimages to Mount Kailash in western
Tibet also contributed to a steady stream of traffic.
The British, like the Sikhs before them, wanted to
access these trade routes and the potentially lucrative
materials flowing along them. The single major British
undertaking to accomplish this was the construction of
the Hindustan-Tibet Road, from the plains up to Simla,
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and then northeastward to Kinnaur, with a branch leading
up through Spiti and Lahaul and another earlier branch
from Dugshai to Ladakh. This project, begun in the spring
of 1850, utilized hundreds of thousands of laborers in
the course of its five-year construction (United Kingdom
House of Commons 1857). More than sixty percent of the
labor used was unpaid, furnished by the individual hill
states as part of an agreement to offer indentured service
(known as begar) to their suzerain rulers.
The initial justifications for such an undertaking were
three-fold:
First, the road could, over time, open up a commercial
route to Tibet that would give the British dependable
access to pashm, the raw material for pashmina ‘cashmere’
which was increasingly being demanded by the Victorian
British upper classes. Early in 1850 the Earl of Dalhousie
wrote that, “this road had been mentioned to me before
as being of great importance with reference to the large
trade which it is believed might be attracted to the plains
of India from the countries beyond the Himalayan range”
(United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 4).
Second, the widening of the first stages of the road would
quickly help ease the difficulties of a growing number
of British tourists visiting the hills and their burgeoning
“sanatoria.”
Third, they wished to abolish the begar system of
indentured servitude, which in the tradition of ironic
logics of rule in South Asia, they themselves had exploited.
Historically, as John Bray (2008) has shown, forms of
obligatory labor—most commonly referred to by the
generic Persian/Urdu term begar—had long been present
in the Himalayan hill states, Ladakh, Kashmir, and Tibet.
This corvée labor had been used in road construction in the
region at least as far back as the 16th century (Bray 2008:
46). For the British, however, the system of local semi-

feudal obligations between hill chiefs and their peasantry
offered a cheap and convenient means of travel in regions
where “commercial transport and boarding houses
economically unattractive” (Guha 2000: 25). In particular,
begar allowed for transport to and around the growing
number of hill stations, which the British were building
in the foothills of the Himalaya. “As embodied in their
settlement agreements,” Guha notes, “landholders were
required to provide, for all government officials on tour
and for white travellers (e.g. shikaris and mountaineers),
several distinct sets of services.” These included laborers
for carrying loads and building temporary rest huts,
as well as provisions. According to the papers on the
Hindustan-Tibet Road’s construction, the use of these
indentured laborers appears to have been most widespread
on the initial segment of the road, running from the
plains at Kalka up to Simla, and in the general vicinity
of Simla. As such, the alleviation of begar may have been
the most immediate reason for expanding the existing
rough road between the plains and Simla, but it was not
deemed a major factor in constructing most of the road,
which extended beyond Simla along the Sutlej and into the
mountains towards the Tibetan Plateau.
The system of begar was increasingly criticized by the late
1840s, and we find Dalhousie writing in 1850:
My first experience of the system, when my camp
came to Simla in April 1849, satisfied me that it
was a great and crying evil, and I have since that
time both seen and heard much that has not
only confirmed my conviction of the reality of
the oppression, but has determined me to omit
no effort to effect its removal. […] The first step
towards this end is the formation of a road from
Simla to the plains at Kalka, capable of being easily
and safely travelled by baggage animals [United
Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 3].
Table 1: Indentured labor
expectations from certain
Himalayan Hill States, 1852
(United Kingdom, House of
Commons 1857:39)
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The papers concerning the construction of the HindustanTibet Road—compiled into a single Parliamentary Report
presented to the House of Commons in 1857—detail
the technological and physical struggles to master the
rivers, mountains, and passes of this terrain. The British
attempt to physically intervene in this challenging
landscape represented a substantial financial investment
and an ambitious and laborious undertaking. Regarding
the determination of the exact route of the road, one
superintendent of the project wrote:
It…appears beyond a doubt that the best line
between Thibet and Hindostan, whether in a
commercial, mathematical, or political point
of view, is one from the uplands of Chang Tang
through Bassahir and Simlah to the plains near
Kalka. Here and here only has the awful barrier of
the Himalayahs been pierced and its ramifications
threaded by the waters of the Sutluj, so that passes
of great elevation do not present themselves, and
the mathematical correctness of the line is not
impaired. This is the line that has been adopted for
the Hindostan and Thibet Road... When completed,
the keen reproach uttered by Moorcroft thirty-five
years ago, will have lost its point and applicability
[United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 73].18
Major J.P. Kennedy, the first superintendent in charge of
overseeing the road’s construction, wrote regarding the
process of planning the road:
The obviously correct mathematical line for a
road passing from the plains northward through
the Hill States, offering at once a commercial
communication with Central Asia through the Hill
States, and an approach to our several sanitary
stations, was indicated by the course of the rivers
Jumna, with some of its tributaries, and the Sutlej
[United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 6-7].
Initially the project employed an average of 3,000 laborers
daily. This number steadily increased. The irregular arrival
of conscripted labor proved to be a continual problem
for the overseers. One superintendent exasperatedly
wrote in 1851: “When at last the numbers were down to
so low an ebb that the native chiefs (threatened by the
Superintendent of the Hill States) became alarmed, a
large influx of wild hill-men was poured upon the road, a
sufficiency of tools was wanting for so great an increase,
and could not be procured at a moment’s warning; the
mass was utterly ignorant of the work required of them”
(United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 32). The lack
of consistent labor and the apparent failure of the local

chiefs to provide food and shelter for their own finally
forced the road’s superintendents to pay more of their
laborers a bare minimum wage. This increased cost
resulted in a reduced expenditure on the construction of
routes deemed to be of less immediate importance. The
road from Simla to Ladakh, was considered one such route.
This route, wrote Dalhousie, “intended to open up the
commerce of central Asia with Hindustan, is of importance
also, but its completion is of less immediate consequence”
(United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 12). Enhancing
access to the growing British sanatoria of the hills quickly
became the principal short-term consideration of the road
builders.
The project faced continued challenges for the next five
years. Delays resulted in the experimental utilization of
heavy quantities of gunpowder to demolish boulders that
were impeding the road’s course. Similar technologies
designed for military use were employed in surveying.
In a letter to the Governor-General’s staff from a chief
engineer, for example, the author notes that, “a gunner’s
quadrant was used by the overseer” (United Kingdom,
House of Commons 1857: 31).
Lieutenant Briggs, in his report to the Governor-General
at the end of the 1852 working season, elaborated on
the discovery of several local mines by describing the
improved tools he was able to fashion from them.
The proximity of these mines to the road may at a
future period render the establishment of a foundry
worthy of the consideration of Government. As an
experiment I last year made up some entrenching
tools of this metal, at a cost of 50 per cent less
than the price of the same description of tools sent
from England. I issued them along with others of
European manufacture to the working parties, and
found they stood the ‘wear and tear’ better than
the latter [United Kingdom, House of Commons
1857: 43].
While the latter portion of the Hindustan and Tibet
Road’s proposed route was surrounded by barren
land, Lieutenant Briggs suggested that certain areas
immediately surrounding the road could be planted with
deodar, “thus in 20 years…the Government will be in
possession of the finest timber in India” (United Kingdom,
House of Commons 1857: 44). This potentially innovative
solution to replenishing and expanding timber supplies
depleted as a result of high demand for temporary bridges,
workers lodgings, and cooking fuel never came to fruition.
However, other regions of the Himalaya became heavily
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utilized timber sources, particularly from the 1860s
onwards (Guha 2000).
Throughout the documents relating to the road’s
construction there is scant mention of the working
conditions of the people who built it. One temporary
superintendent, however, revealingly wrote that, “[t]he
road coolies unquestionably suffer, and are mulet [i.e.
mules] in every possible way, though this would be denied,
and stoutly, and which is my firm belief, makes the coolies
detest every one and every thing connected with the road”
(United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 60).
Another brief glimpse of the terrible conditions under
which the road’s builders toiled occurred on a segment
of the road that required a tunnel, which employed
roughly 10,000 prisoners a day. “Not the least remarkable
circumstance connected with this work is, that it was
constructed almost entirely by prisoners, and without a
single accident. The night reliefs were alone composed of
free labourers, and a few of the same class during the day,
assisted the convicts in wheeling barrows, and in such
work as their chains rendered irksome” (United Kingdom,
House of Commons 1857: 47). These remarks reflect the
sheer coercion and pain involved in much of the road’s
construction.
By 1855, Lieutenant Briggs optimistically looked beyond
the commercial value of the road, suggesting, instead that
in the lower elevations there might one day be a colony
of British retirees whose families will form the basis of a
growing and “acclimated” army.
It has been stated by some, that the annual
repairs of this road will be enormous. [...] As
traffic increases, it will probably be necessary to
metal certain portions of the line, but it is to be
supposed that the increased traffic will afford
increased income. But far above and beyond these
considerations, is the opening out of the fertile
vallies of these mountains to future European
colonists. […] All, and far more than the early
colonists of America ever promised themselves, is
to be found here, where under the blessings of a
mild and paternal government, the colonist might
increase his store, as fully assured of safety to life
and property, as if the scene were in the heart
of Great Britain, instead of under the shadows of
the mighty Himalayahs. Instead of permitting the
old worn-out European pensioner to idle away all
that is left to him of life, under the scorching sun
of Chunar, it might be worthy the attention of
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government to give him a cottage and a spot that
he might call his own within some of these elevated
vallies; where, with something to occupy his time,
he might, under proper superintendence, lay the
foundations of an European colony; the youth of
which, educated to a military life…might furnish
our Indian army with recruits as strong, and better
educated and acclimated, than the mother country
does produce [United Kingdom, House of Commons
1857: 80-1].
Briggs’ optimism here highlights the perception of the
region as a secure space in which British pensioners and
children might flourish, far away from any perceived
threats or, indeed, from any boundary that requires
defending.
Responding to an earlier report by Briggs, Dalhousie
triumphantly wrote:
The whole thing was experimental. People scoffed
at the idea of being able to form a level road
through these enormous mountains at all. No
estimate could be formed of the expense, for no
data existed by which to calculate it. Any reference
to the Military Board would have been useless
for this reason. I, therefore, took upon myself the
responsibility of ordering its construction at once,
directly under my own authority. I venture to think
that the experiment has been eminently successful
[United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 54].
The Governor-General’s tone here suggests that the
project, or the technical challenge of it, may have been
its own end. The road’s construction illustrated—to some
at least—that one of the most challenging landscapes on
earth could be “tamed.”
The massive undertaking of the road’s construction
required a vast array of labor, a detailed accounting of
the progress made and the quantities of earth moved,
and the technological processes involved in surveying,
constructing, and recording the project. Following
1857—or the loss of Dalhousie’s patronage—it appears
that the British Government of India lost interest in the
commercial application of the road.
The failure of the project to produce any significant
commercial results, however, signaled British reluctance
to continue opening up routes into the region. By the
1870s, we find references to the road being occasionally
used by a growing number of hunters, tourists, geologists,
and botanists, but rarely by traders. One commentator in

the Pall Mall Gazette reviewing Major T. C. Montgomerie’s
“Routes in the Western Himalaya, Kashmir, &c,” speculated
that:
No attempt has been made to continue “the great
Hindustan and Tibet road” past Pangay to the
frontier of Chinese Tartary, and we understand the
Indian Government has no intention of expending
money on any such continuation at present. The
Government has been blamed for not doing so on
the alleged ground that without the completion of
this road to the Chinese border the part which has
been made is useless for the purpose of developing
traffic; but the traffic on that line must always be
very limited, and it was really rather for military
than commercial purposes that the road was
constructed as far as Pangay. [The Pall Mall Gazette,
15 July 1874]
This last statement is intriguing. In the hundreds of pages
of documents concerned with the road’s construction—
and in Dalhousie’s own published Private Papers—the
overarching reasons given for its construction are always
trade, access to hill stations, and the dubious alleviation of
the begar system (Baird 1910). This anonymous reviewer’s
insistence on the primacy of a military rationale behind
the road’s construction suggests that by the time of his
writing the frontier region was already being conceived
of primarily as an instrument of imperial security. Instead
of a conduit for trade it became viewed as a tool for
defense of the empire. The questionable strategic value
of the road’s location, however, casts doubt on whether
such an undertaking would ever be financed without an
anticipated revenue source.
Furthermore, in all of the Parliamentary papers
concerning the road’s construction and in Dalhousie’s
own published writings there is no mention of stationing
troops along its path beyond Simla or the construction of
any garrison beyond those temporary structures built to
house EIC officers involved in the project. Dalhousie was
not a Governor-General who shied away from military
projects and their justifications. Besides being known for
his ruthless expansion of British possessions in South Asia
(through conquest and his infamous Doctrine of Lapse),
Dalhousie left behind him a tremendous series of public
work projects (roads, telegraph lines, irrigation systems,
and the beginnings of a railway system). But again, he
never articulates a connection between the HindustanTibet Road and his broader infrastructural projects.
Perhaps, then, the road was primarily a pet project of his—
simply an “experiment,” as he frequently described it, one
with the possible addition of added revenue from trade

in pashmina and an easy conduit for travelers seeking
outdoor adventure. Or perhaps it was built—like many a
monument—to symbolize territorial dominance and the
challenge of the undertaking.
That the road was a commercial failure, however, seems
less debatable. There would be only one other bold British
commercial undertaking in the northwestern Himalaya,
that of the short-lived Central Asian Trading Company.
This low-budget project, begun in the 1870s, attracted
significant press coverage but failed in its objective of
opening up the markets of Yarkand and Kashgar in Chinese
Turkestan. It’s most durable effect, perhaps, was the
contribution to a growing pantheon of heroic imperial
martyrs. While returning from Yarkand, a young Scot,
Andrew Dalgliesh, was killed on the Karakoram Pass
allegedly by an Afghan named Daud Mohammad.19 John
Buchan would later embellish Dalgliesh’s story in A Book of
Escapes and Hurried Journeys.
Other Avenues
While establishing regional hegemony and the less
certain prospects of trade had been central reasons for
the assertion of British control over the northwestern
Himalaya, these were not the only reasons why the British
increasingly ventured into the mountainous periphery of
their domain. The Hindustan-Tibet Road was also, in Simla
district, a conduit to a number of growing hill stations.
As Pamela Kanwar and Dane Kennedy have persuasively
shown, the lure of the mountains as retreats from the
plains drew more and more British to the mountains in the
mid-19th century (Kanwar 1990: 32-33).20 These towns could
function for the British as retreats from the plains and as a
nostalgia inducing chhota vilayat (“little England”). Pamela
Kanwar has aptly styled these hill stations as “imperial
refuge[s]”. Early British recollections of Simla consistently
play with the theme of familiarity to England. “It reminded
me of home, the days of my boyhood, my mother and the
happiest of varied recollections,” wrote William Lloyd
of Simla in 1821 (Lloyd 1840: 141). The northwestern
Himalaya could also, in its higher elevations, provide
exciting exploration potential for vacationing Britons
in the form of hunting, walking, or amateur scientific
pursuits.
While trade continued via local intermediaries in Kashmir,
Ladakh, Spiti, Bashahr, Kullu and Lahaul, the bulk of
British commercial activity in the broader region came
to rest with the British Joint-Commissioners stationed at
Leh beginning in the late 1860s. The commissioner was
tasked with recording the volume of trade passing through
Ladakh to and from the indirectly-governed princely state
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of Kashmir and Jammu to the west, and to and from the
directly- and indirectly-governed districts to the south.
He also monitored any and all information coming from
the north. By the 1870s, the British increasingly viewed
the region as a geo-strategic boundary, one that would
function primarily as a barrier to threats from Russia
and Central Asia. This shift was facilitated in part by the
escalation of security concerns brought on by the rebellion
of 1857 and the threat of a growing Russian presence
in Central Asia. But the inclusion of the northwestern
Himalaya in this increasingly unified frontier was itself
the result of a shift in ‘frontier’ thinking that came about
through the epistemological and scientific mastery of the
empire’s peripheral spaces, most prominently illustrated
by the Survey of India’s “grand trigonometrical survey.”21
The Survey drew upon the practical knowledge amassed
during nearly a century of engineering and mapping
projects that had been crisscrossing the less inaccessible
parts of the subcontinent for nearly 80 years. In the
Himalaya and Central Asia, the Survey developed new
techniques of knowledge gathering that relied on
technical innovations to mechanical instruments and,
more importantly, the training of indigenous (or semiindigenous) “Pundits” as “intelligent instrument[s] of
measure” (Raj 2007: 183). The projects in the region
became covert, knowledge gathering exercises that
relied on intermediaries in lieu of the broader avenues of
infrastructural improvement and direct rule. Kapil Raj has
shown that “[n]ovel survey methods had at times to be
forged for terrains and circumstances that precluded the
use of standard techniques.” Yet the knowledge produced
out of these various surveying projects—diverse in their
locations and practical particulars—could be configured
as standardized applied scientific procedures and utilized
universally. These technological processes increasingly
became linked to security concerns.
Conclusions
When the political reconfigurations of the early 19th
century settled, the British found themselves with a solid
segment of the Himalayan region in their possession. The
varieties of configurations that the space accommodated—
as a commercial conduit, as a retreat from the plains,
and as an amateur laboratory for emerging sciences—
produced an array of uses for an apparently secure
frontier. Furthermore, the construction of the HindustanTibet Road itself involved technoterritorialization, that is,
“engineering land into the state in a way that extends,
through particularizing scientific practices, the depth and
reach of state power” (Carroll 2006: 171).
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The security of this frontier, once technologically
integrated into a cartographically unified space, was
increasingly doubted by an anxious imperial regime after
1857. The “forward” policies that would emerge in the last
decades of the 19th century made such physical frontiers
part of an imperial security complex that would require
‘buffer states’ and neutralized spaces beyond the imperial
domains. As Alfred Lyall wrote in 1891:
…[O]ur political influence radiates out beyond the
line of our actual possession, spreading its skirts
widely and loosely over the adjacent country….
[T]he true frontier of the British dominion in Asia,
the line which we are more or less pledged to
guard, from which we have warned off trespassers,
does not by any means tally with the outer edge
of the immense territory over which we exercise
administrative jurisdiction, in which all the people
are British subjects for whom our governments
make laws. [Lyall 1891: 313-14]
It was this reconfiguring of frontier space driven by
increasingly hawkish Russophobia in the late 19th century
that helped to convince Curzon to invade Tibet in 1903-4.
The period I have surveyed constituted an early phase in
the establishment of British control in the northwestern
Himalaya. A more detailed historical analysis of the region
would be required in order to examine the administrative
mechanisms through which this process was achieved.
Furthermore, any comprehensive examination of this
period must explore the responses to this process by the
indigenous population, as well as by the many and varied
foreign populations that long inhabited the region due to
trade, religious routes, or prior imperial administration.22
There is a bias described by social psychologists as “actorobserver asymmetry” which asserts that individuals tend
to describe their motivations for actions in situational
terms while tending to describe the motivations for
the actions of others in dispositional terms. Without
discounting the existence of a British colonial “disposition”
towards territorial expansion and perennial security
concerns, it is worth remembering the contingent and
“situational” nature of particular historical episodes in the
British encounter with South Asia. When confronted with a
newly acquired and apparently pacific space at the edge of
their growing South Asian empire, British administrators
attempted to make use of it in a variety of ways. It would
be naïve to assume that security concerns were not
present in the minds of British administrators during the
first half of the 19th century, particularly given the East
India Company’s nearly continual use of military force in

fulfilling its ostensibly commercial purpose. By the late
1840s, however, the northwestern Himalaya was perceived
to be sufficiently secure so as to allow for a variety of
experiments that would not be possible on British India’s
more contested frontiers. The building of the HindustanTibet Road represents the most prominent case of this
experimentation. It was built in part to access unknown
commercial markets and expand the ease of access to the
growing British retreats in the mountains, but also, as
Dalhousie noted, because “people scoffed at the idea of
being able to form a level road through these enormous
mountains at all.” In his estimation, “the experiment [was]
eminently successful.” Those of us who have had occasion
to travel along that road may disagree.
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Endnotes
1. Lloyd is referring to Simla. Its Romanized spellings have
varied over time, most recently settling on “Shimla,” which
more accurately reflects its namesake, the Hindu goddess
Shyamala Devi. For this paper I have used the dominant
form found in the British sources, “Simla.”
2. Aniket Alam makes a similar conclusion in the preface to
his survey of the western Himalaya under British rule (Alam
2008).
3. The British administrators whose papers I have
examined understood the region to be part of China, or
“Chinese Tartary” and were aware of the existence of
nearby trade routes running from central Tibet towards
“Chinese Turkestan” and Ladakh, largely as a result of the
explorations of Moorcroft, Trebeck, Gerard, Lloyd, and
others.
4. From the 1790s till Younghusband’s invasion in 1903-4,
successive Tibetan governments in Lhasa would actively
work to prevent incursions along their southern and
western borders. This isolation became a political issue
for the British once their own Himalayan borders became
more technically defined in the latter half of the 19th
century and they perceived it to be diplomatically and
militarily necessary to establish diplomatic relations with
Lhasa. During the time period discussed in this paper the
British were aware of Tibet’s political isolation but had
little information about the region that lay beyond the
northwestern Himalaya. See Lamb (1986). The papers
concerning the construction of the Hindustan-Tibet Road
suggest that by 1850 British administrators still had little
understanding of the territory that lay beyond their
newly acquired northwestern Himalayan lands. However,
as Lamb notes, “since 1792 the Chinese seem to have
been…fully aware of the growing British power south of
the Himalayas.” (1986: 49). It is clear that information
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was moving much more clearly on the Tibetan/Chinese
side of the Himalaya where reports of Moorcroft’s travels
induced Lhasa to communicate to its frontier guards that no
Europeans were to be admitted.
5. Lieutenant David Briggs, supervisor of much of the
Hindustan-Tibet Road’s construction, cites William
Moorcroft’s unheeded warning (circa 1820), that “whether
[Tibetans and Central Asians] shall be clothed with the
broadcloth of Russia or of England...with hardware of
every description from Petersburgh [i.e. St. Petersburg] or
Birmingham, is entirely in the decision of the Government
of British India. At present there is little doubt to which
the prize will be awarded, for enterprise and vigour mark
the measure of Russia towards the nations of Central Asia,
whilst ours are characterised by misplaced squeamishness
and unnecessary timidity” (United Kingdom, House of
Commons 1857: 73).
6. Foremost among these scholars is Alastair Lamb.
Throughout his many published volumes he details British
policies and the political antagonisms that produced the
frontiers and borders of the greater Himalayan region:
Lamb (1960, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1973, 1986). See also McKay
(2003). McKay argues that the Younghusband mission of
1903-4 was the culmination of a policy of British frontier
expansion that began in the latter half of the 18th century
and was accelerated by the “forward school” in the late
19th century.
7. The term is Patrick Carroll’s. He writes: “I use the term
technoterritoriality to emphasize the theoretical point that
the issue of territory, in the context of the modern state, is
only partly captured by reference to coercive or sovereign
dominion within a landmass (which can include territorial
waters, islands, and colonies). Modern territoriality involves
engineering land into the state in a way that extends,
through particularizing scientific practices, the depth and
reach of state power” (Carroll 2006: 171).
8. A list of such texts would include the travel narratives
of Lloyd and Gerard (1840), Moorcroft and Trebeck
(1841), Vigne (1844), Thomson (1852), Hooker (1854), and
Cunningham (1854).
9. For an example of such writings, see Desideri (1937).
10. To the best of my knowledge, this report is only
available in the archives of the Foreign Department, Secret
Branch, National Archives of India. This material is thus
drawn from Aniket Alam’s reading of this archive.
11. Alam (2008), citing Herbert (1819) and Gerard (n.d.).

14. The Examiner (London), 12 February 1842: “Thibet: it
at one time appeared probable that Zorawar Sing would
succeed in wrestling from the Chinese some portion of their
Thibetian territory. Our celestial friends, however, have
now entered the field against the enemy; and the Seikh
forces have given way, and are retreating on Ladakh, quite
discomfited.”
15. For an account of this period in Urdu, see Pandit
(1970).
16. Gulab Singh had earlier helped the British against the
Sikhs.
17. Known in Tibetan and Ladakhi as the “Lhasa Ka-che.”
According to Professor Karma Ngondup, “Ka-che” is likely a
corruption of the Tibetan “khashi” (i.e. Kashmir).
18. For Moorcroft’s “reproach,” see note 5.
19. See Gill (2000) and Rizvi (1999).
20. See also Kennedy (1996).
21. For the history of this process from its inception
through the mid-19th century, see Matthew Edney’s seminal work, Edney (1997); for its gradual imbrication within
the larger security state of British India in the latter half of
the 19th century, see Raj (2007).
22. For an example of such work see Moran (2007).
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